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An auction is combinatorial when bidders can place bids on combinations of items,
called “packages,” rather than just individual items. Computer scientists are inter-
ested in combinatorial auctions because they are concerned with the expressiveness
of bidding languages, as well as the algorithmic aspects of the underlying combina-
torial problem. The combinatorial problem has attracted attention from operations
researchers, especially those working in combinatorial optimization and mathemati-
cal programming, who are fascinated by the idea of applying these tools to auctions.
Auctions have been studied extensively by economists, of course.2 Thus, the newly
emerging ﬁeld of combinatorial auctions lies at the intersection of computer science,
operations research, and economics.
In this article, we present a brief introduction to combinatorial auctions, based
on our book, Combinatorial Auctions (MIT Press, 2006), in which we look at com-
binatorial auctions from all three perspectives. Indeed, our contribution is to take
an integrated and comprehensive approach. We have done this in three ways. First,
we have deﬁned what we see as the ﬁve major subﬁelds comprising combinatorial
auctions: mechanisms, bidding and eﬃciency, complexity and algorithmic consid-
erations, testing and implementation, and applications. The book is accordingly
divided into ﬁve sections, with chapters written by the foremost experts on each
topic within each subﬁeld. Second, we have deﬁned for the ﬁrst time a common lan-
1This article is based on our introductory chapter to Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton,
Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), MIT Press, 2006.
2Operations researchers were also active contributors to the early work on auctions, see for ex-
ample, Friedman (1955) and Rothkopf (1969). Indeed, most of the early work on auctions ﬁrst
appeared in operations research journals.
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guage for combinatorial auctions, which has been accepted by researchers from all
three communities, and have made a serious eﬀort to use these terms consistently
throughout the book. The most common terms are deﬁned in the book’s glossary.
Third, the chapters are all cross-referenced; thus, for example, a mention of the
Vickrey auction in any later chapter will refer back to the ﬁrst chapter in the book
by Ausubel and Milgrom on “The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction.” The fore-
word to the book is penned by Vernon L. Smith, who founded the ﬁeld, together
Stephen J. Rassenti and Robert L. Bulﬁn in 1982, with the publication of their
paper, “A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation.”
The book took four years from conception to completion. We were fortunate
to attract as contributors most of the major researchers working in combinatorial
auctions. The book was published by MIT Press in 2006.
2. COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS IN PRACTICE
There are numerous examples of combinatorial auctions in practice. As is typical
of many ﬁelds, practice precedes theory. Simple combinatorial auctions have been
used for many decades in, for example, estate auctions. A common procedure is to
auction the individual items, and then, at the end, to accept bids for packages of
items. If a package bid exceeds the sum of the individual bids for the items in the
package, then the items are sold as a package. In our book we consider a variety of
much more general combinatorial auctions, but the key ingredient is the same as
in this simple case: each bidder can submit bids on packages of items.
Recently, combinatorial auctions have been employed in a variety of industries.
For example, they have been used for truckload transportation, bus routes, and
industrial procurement, and have been proposed for airport arrival and departure
slots, as well as for allocating radio spectrum for wireless communications services.
Combinatorial auctions for radio spectrum have been conducted in both the United
States and Nigeria. Most recently, the United Kingdom has proposed combinatorial
auctions for spectrum, based in large part on the clock-proxy auction discussed
later. In each application, the compelling motivation for the use of a combinatorial
auction is the presence of complementarities among the items which diﬀer across
bidders. For example, a trucker’s cost of handling shipments in one lane depends
on its loads in other lanes. Similarly, a mobile phone operator may value licenses
in two adjacent cities more than the sum of the individual license values, since the
operator’s customers value roaming between cities.
3. BASIC AUCTION THEORY
Auction theory is among the most inﬂuential and widely studied topics in economics
of the last forty years. Auctions ask and answer the most fundamental questions
in economics: who should get the goods and at what prices? In answering these
questions, auctions provide the micro-foundation of markets. Indeed, many modern
markets are organized as auctions.
To understand the role of combinatorial auctions, it is useful to step back and
think about auctions in general. Some auction types are familiar, such as the
ascending-bid English auction used in many online consumer auctions, or the ﬁrst-
price sealed-bid auction used in many public procurements. More fundamentally,
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auctions are distinguished not only by the rules of the auction, such as ascending
versus sealed-bid, but by the auction environment. These combinatorial auctions
can be studied in a wide range of auction environments. Important features, in-
cluding the numbers of sellers and buyers, the number of items being traded, the
preferences of the parties, and the form of the private information participants have
about preferences, all determine the auction environment.
The benchmark environment is the private value model, introduced by Vickrey
(1961), which is discussed here in detail by Ausubel and Milgrom in Chapter 1.
In the private value model, each bidder has a value for each package of items
and these values do not depend on the private information of the other bidders.
Each bidder knows his values, but not the values of the other bidders. Vickrey’s
seminal paper, mentioned in his 1996 Nobel Prize in economics, introduced the
independent private value model, demonstrated equilibrium bidding behavior in a
ﬁrst-price auction, and then showed that truthful bidding could be induced as a
dominant strategy by modifying the pricing rule: let each bidder pay the social
opportunity cost of his winnings, rather than his bid. Finally, he showed in an
example what would later be proven generally as the revenue equivalence theorem:
diﬀerent auction mechanisms that result in the same allocation of goods yield the
same revenue to the seller.
Thus, when auctioning a single item to n bidders, whose payoﬀs are linear in
the bidder’s valuation of the item and money (ui = vi – p, where ui is bidder i’s
utility, vi is i’s the value of the item, and p is the price paid for the item) and where
each value is drawn independently from the same probability distribution, both the
ﬁrst-price and second-price auction award the item to the bidder with the highest
value and yield the seller the same expected revenue.
Most of the chapters in our book use Vickrey’s private value model and many
make use of the Vickrey pricing rule, at least as a benchmark for comparison with
alternative mechanisms.
Wilson (1969) took auction theory in a new direction. He introduced the common
value auction model, in which items have the same value to all bidders, but this
value is uncertain and depends on the private information of all bidders. He derived
the ﬁrst analysis of equilibrium bidding with common values, demonstrating the
importance of conditioning one’s bid on the negative information winning implies,
and thus avoiding what would later be called the winner’s curse—the tendency for
bidders, who do not understand that winning is bad news about one’s estimate of
value, to pay more than the item is worth.
Milgrom extended Wilson’s early papers in several ways. Most importantly, he
introduced an auction model with both private value and common value elements.
The private value model of Vickrey and common value model of Wilson represent
two extreme cases. These extreme models are useful in deriving strong theoretical
results, but most practical auction environments have both private and common
value elements. Milgrom (1981) showed the importance of the monotone likelihood
ratio property in obtaining results in a realistic hybrid model.3 In particular the
3A probability density function f satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property if the ratio
f(v|t)/f(v|s) is weakly increasing in v for all t > s. Typically, f(v|s) is the probability
density of a bidder’s value v conditional on the signal s (an estimate of value). Intuitively, the
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monotone likelihood ratio property, together with Wilson’s assumption of condi-
tional independence, means that (1) bidders use monotonic bidding strategies and
(2) that a monotonic strategy satisfying the ﬁrst-order condition constitutes an
equilibrium.
Milgrom’s model led to the aﬃliated values model (Milgrom and Weber 1982)
in which a bidder’s value depends directly on the private information of all the
bidders. The critical condition here, closely related to the monotone likelihood
ratio property in Milgrom (1981), is that the bidders’ signals, typically estimates
of value, are aﬃliated random variables. This amounts to the plausible condition
that if one bidder has a high signal of value, it is more likely that the signals of the
other bidders are high. The paper shows that Vickrey’s revenue equivalence result
no longer holds when we introduce a common value element. In particular, the
revenues from the standard auction formats diﬀer and can be ranked. Formats like
ascending auctions, in which the price is linked to more aﬃliated private information
yield higher revenues.
The early work of Vickrey, Wilson, and Milgrom was largely focused on an
equilibrium analysis and comparison of standard auction formats. Myerson led
the development of mechanism design theory, which enables the researcher to
characterize equilibrium outcomes of all auction mechanisms, and identify opti-
mal mechanisms—those mechanisms that maximize some objective, such as seller
revenues. His ﬁrst application was to auctions. Myerson (1981) determined the
revenue-maximizing auction with risk-neutral bidders and independent private in-
formation. He also proved a general revenue equivalence theorem that says that
revenues depend fundamentally on how the items are assigned—any two auction
formats that lead to the same assignment of the items yield the same revenues to
the seller.
The trick in Myerson’s analysis was recognizing that any auction can be repre-
sented as a direct mechanism in which bidders simultaneously report their private
information and then the mechanism determines assignments and payments based
on the vector of reports. For any equilibrium of any auction game, there is an
equivalent direct mechanism in which bidders truthfully report types and agree to
participate. Hence, without loss of generality we can look at incentive compati-
ble and individually rational mechanisms to understand properties of all auction
games. Incentive compatibility respects the fact that the bidders have private in-
formation about their values; individual rationality respects the bidders’ voluntary
participation decision. This key idea is known as the revelation principle (Myerson
1979).
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) use this technique to prove the general impos-
sibility of eﬃcient bargaining when it is not common knowledge that gains from
trade exist; that is, when it is not certain that a mutually beneﬁcial agreement
is possible. This same impossibility extends to auctions in which both sellers and
buyers possess private information, although eﬃciency becomes possible when the
traders jointly own the items (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer 1987). Likewise,
if the roles of buyer and seller are not ﬁxed ex ante, but the traders may take on
either role depending on price, then eﬃcient mechanisms exist (Wilson 1993).
likelihood of high values increases with the estimate of value.
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These early papers led to the rapid development of auction theory in the 1980s
and 1990s. In addition, large empirical and experimental literatures have sprung
from the theory. This work is summarized in a number of articles and books, for
example, McAfee and McMillan (1987), Kagel and Roth (1995), Klemperer (2000,
2004), Krishna (2002), and Milgrom (2004).
4. WHY COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS?
A shortcoming of most of the work mentioned above (Milgrom 2004 is an exception)
is the failure to recognize that in many auction environments bidders care in com-
plex ways about the packages of items they win. The advantage of combinatorial
auctions (CAs) is that the bidder can more fully express his preferences. This is
particularly important when items are complements. Items are complements when
a set of items has greater utility than the sum of the utilities for the individual
items (for example, a pair of shoes is worth more than the value of a left shoe alone
plus the value of a right shoe alone). The auction designer also derives value from
CAs. Allowing bidders more fully to express preferences often leads to improved
economic eﬃciency (allocating the items to those who value them most) and greater
auction revenues.
However, alongside their advantages, CAs raise a host of questions and chal-
lenges. Our book is devoted to discussing these questions, as well as the consider-
able progress made in answering them.
5. TYPES OF COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
Our book begins in Part I with a description and analysis of various combinatorial
auction mechanisms.
The most famous combinatorial auction is the combinatorial generalization of
the Vickrey auction already mentioned, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mecha-
nism. Ausubel and Milgrom (Chapter 1) explore the question of why the Vickrey
auction with its appealing theoretical properties is seen so little in practice. In a
VCG auction (also called a Vickrey auction), bidders report their valuations for all
packages; items are allocated eﬃciently to maximize total value. Each winner pays
the opportunity cost of his winnings: the incremental value that would be derived
by assigning the bidder’s items according to their next best use among the other
bidders. In this way, a winning bidder achieves a proﬁt equal to his incremental
contribution to total value, and it is a dominant strategy for the bidder to truthfully
report his values. Achieving eﬃciency in truth-dominant strategies is remarkable.
Nonetheless, there are serious shortcomings. Most importantly, bidders are asked
to express values for all packages without the aid of any information about prices.
Also, when complementarities are large, seller revenues can be too low,4 and adding
bidders or increasing bidder values can reduce seller revenue.
In Chapter 2, Parkes examines iterative combinatorial auctions. A major moti-
vation for an iterative process is to help the bidders express their preferences by
providing provisional pricing and allocation information. This information helps
the bidders focus their valuation eﬀorts on options that are most relevant.
4Goods are substitutes when increasing the price of one does not reduce demand for the other.
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In Chapter 3, Ausubel and Milgrom consider the ascending proxy auction (Ausubel
and Milgrom 2002) as an alternative to the Vickrey auction. Each bidder submits
valuation information to a proxy agent. The proxy agents bid iteratively, bidding
on the most proﬁtable package, whenever the proxy agent is not a provisional win-
ner. The auction ends when no proxy agent who is not a provisional winner has
a proﬁtable bid. The ascending proxy auction allows for bidders to have budget
constraints. In the absence of budget constraints, and when goods are substitutes
for all bidders, the ascending proxy auction yields the same outcome as the Vickrey
auction. More generally, the ascending proxy auction ﬁnds a bidder-optimal point
in the core with respect to the reported preferences. Moreover, all bidder-optimal
core points are Nash equilibria in the auction game, if we assume full information
about values (each bidder knows the values of the other bidders). The ascending
proxy auction addresses many of the drawbacks of the Vickrey auction in environ-
ments with some complements.
The simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) is studied by Cramton in Chapter
4. The SAA is not a combinatorial auction, since bids in a SAA are placed for
individual items, rather than packages of items. Yet the SAA has proven to be a
highly eﬀective method of auctioning many related items (see Cramton 1998, 2002
and Milgrom 2004). Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enables price discovery,
which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. The SAA remains a useful
benchmark for comparison with true combinatorial auctions.
In Chapter 5, Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom propose the clock-proxy auction
as a practical combinatorial design. A clock auction is followed by a best-and-ﬁnal
proxy round. The clock auction is a simple dynamic auction. In each round, the
auctioneer announces a price. Each bidder then indicates the quantity it desires to
buy at that price. In subsequent rounds, the price increases, and each bidder again
expresses the quantity it desires to buy at the new price. This process is repeated
until there is no excess demand. The clock-proxy approach combines the simple
and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the eﬃciency of the proxy
auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in
the proxy round to improve eﬃciency and enhance seller revenues. The approach
has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the
clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand
reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies. Without the best-and-
ﬁnal proxy round, the authors present an iterative combinatorial auction that can
be implemented as a simple clock auction, avoiding all computational complexity
issues in a process with highly useful price discovery (Ausubel and Cramton 2004).
This auction format recently has been used in over two dozen high-stake auctions
in several countries and several industries.
Chapter 6 discusses a combinatorial auction procedure called PAUSE, proposed
by Frank Kelly and Richard Steinberg, which relieves the auctioneer of having to
face the “winner determination problem” which as discussed below is a computa-
tionally intractable problem. Under PAUSE, the burden of evaluating a combina-
torial bid is transferred to the bidder making the bid; the auctioneer need only
conﬁrm the bid’s validity, a computationally tractable problem. As a consequence,
although PAUSE permits all combinatorial bids, the procedure is both compu-
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tationally tractable for the auctioneer and transparent to the bidders. In their
chapter, Land, Powell, and Steinberg focus speciﬁcally on bidder behavior under
PAUSE.
6. BIDDING AND EFFICIENCY
As mentioned above, combinatorial auctions give rise to a host of interesting ques-
tions and challenges. To begin with, there is the question of what should be the
bidding language—how bidder preferences are expressed. Diﬀerent choices vary in
expressiveness and in simplicity. A bid in an auction is an expression of the bid-
der’s preference for various outcomes. The most direct way of capturing such a
preference is to have a bidder attach a monetary value to each possible allocation.
This allows one to express all possible preferences, but it is not simple. Given n
bidders and m items, it requires a bidder to submit a bid of size nm. If we assume
no externalities, so that each bidder cares only about the items he himself receives,
the complexity drops to 2m, which is still impractical for all but small m.
Part II of our book addresses both bidding languages and questions of eﬃciency.
Auction theory generally assumes a ﬁxed number of bidders with each bidder acting
independently according to the rules of the auction. One simple deviation from this
model is for a single bidder to act as multiple bidders. Such pseudonymous bidding
is the subject of Chapter 7. Yokoo shows that the Vickrey auction is not immune to
this problem, unless a bidder submodularity condition is satisﬁed. And indeed all
eﬃcient auctions suﬀer from this problem. It sometimes is proﬁtable for a bidder
to bid as multiple bidders, rather than one, and this undermines eﬃciency.
In Chapter 8, Bikhchandani and Ostroy examine the connection between eﬃcient
auctions for many items, and duality theory. The Vickrey auction can be thought
of as an eﬃcient pricing equilibrium, which corresponds to the optimal solution
of a particular linear programming (LP) problem and its dual. A “buyers are
substitutes” condition is necessary and suﬃcient for the pricing equilibrium to
yield the Vickrey outcome. Thus, when buyers are substitutes, an eﬃcient pricing
equilibrium can be obtained with any LP algorithm. The simplex algorithm can be
thought of as a static approach to determining the Vickrey outcome. Alternatively,
the primal-dual algorithm can be thought of as a decentralized and dynamic method
of determine the pricing equilibrium, as in the ascending proxy auction of Chapter
3.
In Chapter 9, Nisan examines a variety of bidding languages and their properties.
For example, we see there that OR (“additive-or”) bids, which allow the bidder to
make non-exclusive oﬀers on bundles, can capture all, and only, the super-additive
valuations. In contrast, XOR (“exclusive-or”) bids, which allow the bidder to make
exclusive oﬀers on bundles, can capture all valuations, though they may require
an exponentially longer expression than the OR bids. However, asking an agent
to disclose a full valuation function is often not necessary, since many parts of it
might be irrelevant for computing the allocation.
In Chapter 10, Sandholm and Boutilier look at ways in which the valuation func-
tion of agents can be elicited piecemeal, as needed by the auctioneer. One of the
questions there is what form the queries may take. Sandholm and Boutilier consider
several primary forms; these include queries about absolute bundle values, diﬀer-
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ences between two bundle values, a simple ordering on bundle values, and several
others. Among the experimental results they show is the fact that in practice only
a small fraction of the preferences need to be revealed. Among the theoretical re-
sults presented are some natural valuation classes where preferences can be elicited
with a polynomial number of queries even in the worst case; the fact that even if
the real preferences only fall approximately into these classes, an approximation
can be found with a polynomial number of queries; and the fact that there can be
super-exponential power in interleaving queries across agents (i.e., deciding what
to ask an agent based on what others have revealed).
Segal in Chapter 11 asks how many bits of information are required to compute
an eﬃcient allocation, regardless of the protocol used and disregarding issues of
incentives. One result states that any mechanism that is guaranteed to compute an
eﬃcient allocation must necessarily also discover supporting prices (though these
will in general be neither anonymous nor linear). The main question addressed
by Segal is how one can trade oﬀ the extent of communication required with the
economic surplus gained. For example, the trivial protocol in which bidders com-
municate their value for the entire set of goods, which is allocated to the highest
bidder (again, ignoring the issue of incentives), guarantees 1/n of the available
surplus (where n is the number of bidders) while requiring a single bid from each
bidder. A more elaborate mechanism yields 1/ √
m of the available surplus, where m
is the number of goods. Interestingly, this is also a lower bound for any protocol
whose running time is polynomial in m.
7. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND ALGORITHMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Once the bidding language is ﬁxed, the question remains as to how to compute
the allocation, given a set of bids. This problem, called the winner determination
problem (WDP) has received considerable attention in the literature, and is the
primary focus of Part III.
In Chapter 12, Lehmann, M¨ uller and Sandholm provide a precise formulation
of the problem and explore its basic complexity properties. The problem is this:
Given a set of bids in a combinatorial auction, ﬁnd an allocation of items to bidders,
including the possibility that the auctioneer retains some items, that maximizes
the auctioneer’s revenue. The problem, which is most naturally represented as an
integer program (IP), is inherently complex. Speciﬁcally, it is NP-hard, meaning
that there does not exist a polynomial-time algorithm that is guaranteed to compute
the optimal allocation. Even worse, the problem is not uniformly approximable, in
the following sense: there does not exist a polynomial-time algorithm and a constant
d that, for all inputs, produces an answer that is at least 1/d of the correct optimal
answer.
We then follow this sobering introduction to the WDP with some good news.
First, in Chapter 13, M¨ uller explores some constraints on the set of bids that
ensure that a polynomial-time solution does exist. One such condition is for the
constraint matrix to be totally unimodular. A special case of this is of linear goods;
for example, if each bid is for some contiguous stretch of time on a shared machine,
the problem can be solved in quadratic time. Then, in Chapter 14, Sandholm looks
at algorithms for solving the general problem. While we know that in the worst
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case any algorithm will run in exponential time, there exist rules of thumb for
searching the space of allocations that in practice allow us to solve large problems
(for example, with hundreds of thousands of bids and tens of thousands of items).
Sandholm concentrates on complete heuristics, ones that guarantee that an optimal
solution is found but do not guarantee the running time.
The discussion of the WDP in Chapters 12, 13, and 14 ignores issues of incen-
tives. The optimization is assumed to be inherited from some mechanism, such as
the VCG mechanism, but solved without regard to the originating mechanism. As
discussed, these problems are computationally hard, and sometimes admit only sub-
optimal solutions. In Chapter 15, Ronen looks at the impact of such sub-optimal
optimization on the incentive properties of mechanisms. For example, it is shown
that with sub-optimal procedures, the VCG mechanism is no longer individually ra-
tional, nor is it incentive compatible. However, a modiﬁcation of VCG is presented
that restores individual rationality and, to a certain extent, incentive compatibility.
The chapter covers several other topics, including a non-VCG mechanism that is
computationally easy and incentive compatible.
In the ﬁnal chapter of Part III, Chapter 16, Peke and Rothkopf consider appro-
priate ways to reduce or avoid computational diﬃculties in combinatorial auctions.
The authors brieﬂy review the computational issues in combinatorial auction de-
sign, the context of auction design including the information available to the de-
signer, and properties that the auction designer must trade oﬀ in selecting the
auction format and procedures. The major part of their chapter discuss opportu-
nities for mitigating computational problems at four points in the auction: before
bid submission, at the time of bid submission, after bid submission but before the
announcement of a tentative set of winning bids, and after the announcement of a
tentative set of winning bids.
8. TESTING AND IMPLEMENTATION
In Part IV, we pick up the question of how to test experimentally the various pro-
posed solutions to the WDP as well as how best to test and implement mechanisms
from Part I.
In Chapter 17, Hoﬀman, Menon, van den Heever, and Wilson consider how best
to implement the ascending proxy auction of Chapter 3. Three approaches for
accelerating the algorithm are considered. The ﬁrst involves working backward
from the eﬃcient allocation and starting with the Vickrey prices, which provide a
lower bound on prices. The second approach, increment scaling, solves the problem
with large bid increments and then backs up and solves the problem again with
reduced increments until the desired accuracy is obtained. The third approach
combines the previous two. These three approaches each dramatically reduce the
number of iterations needed to determine the ascending proxy outcome.
In Chapter 18, Leyton-Brown and Shoham present the Combinatorial Auction
Test Suite (CATS). CATS is a publicly available software package that generates
a variety of winner determination problems. Speciﬁcally, it implements several
parameterized families of bid distributions, some based on real-world applications
(such as transportation networks), and some on historical distributions used by
researchers in the ﬁeld. The goal of CATS is to serve as a uniform test suite for
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WDP algorithms, and it has been used widely in this capacity.
In Chapter 19, Leyton-Brown, Nudelman and Shoham use CATS to evaluate the
running times of algorithms for the winner determination problem. The diﬃculty
is that, since the problem is NP-complete, even the best heuristic procedures will
take exponential time for some instances. In many applications, it is important
to know in advance how long a given algorithm will run on a given instance (for
example, an auction for energy production tomorrow needs to determine a schedule
of operation well in advance of tomorrow). The authors describe how machine
learning techniques can be used to predict this running time reliably, and which
features of a given instance are most predictive of this running time. As a bonus,
they also describe a portfolio approach to the WDP, whereby several competing
algorithms are pressed into service, and for each instance the algorithm that is
predicted to perform best is chosen.
9. FOUR IMPORTANT APPLICATIONS OF COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
In their seminal paper on combinatorial auctions, Rassenti, Smith, and Bulﬁn
(1982) present a sealed-bid combinatorial auction for the allocation of airport time
slots (i.e., takeoﬀ and landing slots) to competing airlines.5 Even if landing slots
are bundled with takeoﬀ slots (much like left and right shoes are bundled), the
need for a combinatorial auction follows from the diﬀering ways that airlines value
packages of slots: some are substitutes, some are complements, and the valuations
vary across airlines. Congestion at many major airports is becoming an increas-
ingly important problem. The Federal Aviation Administration is now evaluating
a combinatorial auction approach for New York’s LaGuardia airport.
The ﬁnal section of our book, Part V, considers four important applications of
combinatorial auctions. Chapter 20 takes up the topic of auctions for airport time
slots. Ball, Donohue, and Hoﬀman provide suggestions for mechanisms for air trans-
portation systems to both expand capacity and to assure that the current, limited
capacity is used both safely and eﬃciently. The authors begin by providing a de-
scription of the history of the U.S. Aviation System, detail current procedures for
allocating landing time slots, and explain how market-clearing mechanisms might
be able to rectify many of the shortcomings of the current system. They include a
presentation of some of the important elements that should be included in combi-
natorial auctions in this setting.
In Chapter 21, Caplice and Sheﬃ explore how combinatorial auctions are being
used for the procurement of freight transportation services, focusing on those at-
tributes of transportation that make combinatorial auctions especially attractive,
as well as describing some of the unique elements of transportation auctions. They
present such auctions ﬁrst from the perspective of the auctioneer, i.e., the shipper,
then from the perspective of the bidder, i.e., the carrier. This is followed by a
5This was the ﬁrst major paper on combinatorial auctions. It introduced many important ideas,
such as the mathematical programming formulation of the auctioneer’s problem, the connection
between the winner determination problem and the set packing problem as well as the concomi-
tant issue of computational complexity, the use of techniques from experimental economics for
testing combinatorial auctions, and consideration of issues of incentive compatibility and demand
revelation in combinatorial auctions.
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discussion of the relationships between shippers and carriers, since the contracts
that govern them have certain characteristics that distinguish them to some extent
from auctions for other applications discussed elsewhere in our book. In fact, the
types of bids used in transportation are distinctive to that industry, so there is an
entire section discussing them. In this industry, the winner determination prob-
lem is known as the “Carrier Assignment Problem,” which is discussed next in the
chapter. Finally, the authors present lessons from practice.
In Chapter 22, we move from the private sector to the public sector. As Cantillon
and Pesendorfer explain, the London bus routes market provides an early example
of the use of a combinatorial auction format in public procurement. The authority
responsible for the provision and procurement of public transport services in the
Greater London area—valued at $900 million—was London Regional Transport
(LRT). The authors present the four major issues faced by LRT. First, what should
be the set of contracts auctioned? Second, how should LRT auction these contracts?
Third, who should be allowed to participate? Finally, which criteria should they use
to award the contracts? The authors also discuss the motivations for submitting
a package bid, a description of their data together with summary statistics, and
ﬁnally their empirical analysis.
The ﬁnal chapter of our book, Chapter 23, discusses combinatorial auctions for
industrial procurement, which is potentially one of the largest application domains
for combinatorial auctions. As pointed out by the authors, Bichler, Davenport,
Hohner, and Kalagnanam, CAs have already turned into a topic of interest for
software vendors and procurement managers in the business-to-business domain.
However, despite reports of the existence of a number of applications of combinato-
rial auctions in industrial procurement, documentation and public information on
design details are rare—possibly because of eﬀorts to protect proprietary informa-
tion. This chapter describes current practice in this domain, including a case study
at Mars, Inc.
10. CONCLUSION
Both the research and practice of combinatorial auctions have grown rapidly over
the past dozen years. Our book aims to make this knowledge accessible to a broad
group of researchers and practitioners. However, we have a more ambitious goal.
Our hope is that, by integrating the work from the three underlying disciplines of
economics, operations research, and computer science, progress on combinatorial
auctions will be enhanced. Our book lays the foundation by aggregating and harmo-
nizing the research on combinatorial auctions. We are conﬁdent that the profession
will continue to develop the theory and application of combinatorial auctions. We
hope that the foundation provided in our book will help in this process.
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